Let’s be brutally honest for a second. Most of what our industry lovingly calls “Detection Engineering” is just taking a MITRE ATT&CK tag (like T1110), stapling it to a fragile KQL query, and praying the SOC analysts don’t unionize over the false positive rate. We see a bad event, we flag it. But what happens […]

Let’s be brutally honest for a second: out-of-the-box LLMs are like that one extremely confident junior analyst who just finished a boot camp. They’ve read all the manuals, they know exactly what a where clause is, and they will absolutely swear on their life that a table named WindowsMagicLogEvents_Pls_Work exists in your tenant. They hallucinate. […]

Let’s face facts: most detection engineering pipelines are glorified suggestion boxes where half-baked ideas go to die. We’ve all seen it. An analyst gets a caffeine rush, scribbles down “detect malicious identity behavior” or “catch bad PowerShell,” and calls it a day. The result is typically untestable, lacks telemetry context, and has absolutely zero triage […]

Let’s be honest with ourselves for a minute. The cybersecurity industry still romanticizes the adversary. We picture a guy in a dark hoodie, hopped up on energy drinks, furiously typing commands into a Kali Linux terminal while synthwave plays in the background. We build our detection frameworks around this guy. We assume he makes typos, […]